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Abstract

Organizations are increasingly inter-connected as they
source talent, goods and services from other organizations
located in disparate parts of the world. They seek new
ways of creating value for themselves, customers and
partners. They operate outside and across traditional
industry boundaries and definitions. These innovations
have lead to a focus on business models as a fundamental
statement of direction and identity. This paper highlights
what is known about the business model concept and
where and why it differs from more established concepts of
business strategy. It illustrates how the application of
business models has transformed organizations. The
contribution of this paper is the guidance that it provides
for business model design and the insight it provides into
business models and their effects on organizations.
Following an analysis of how business models can
transform organizations, this paper concludes with
practical recommendations for business model design.

1. Introduction

The term “business model” is a recent addition to the
management literature and largely a product of the dot
com era. It is entirely absent from all the most influential
books on organizational design, business strategy, business
economics and business theory through to the mid- to late
1990s. It is almost everywhere in books on e-commerce,
both scholarly and business trade press. It is a marketing
catchphrase for IT vendors. This paper reviews business
model thought and practice in terms of its contribution to
general organizational theory and practice beyond just the
e-commerce sphere. The first questions to ask are not
“what is a business model?” but why has the term so
suddenly appeared? If business thought and practice
evolved for a century without it, is business model now a
necessary construct or just a short-lived label? What does
it add to our thinking to use it instead of, say, “strategy”,
“competitive positioning”, “organizational design”, “value
chain”, or other more well-established terms?
We examine business models from this perspective of
necessary construct versus superfluous neologism. This
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requires filtering out the signals from a great deal of noise.
As Hawkins states: “as the [dot com] bubble grew, the
market filled up with books and articles about business
models, ranging from the vaguely analytic to the quasi
instructional – how to construct viable business models
and how to avoid lemons. The business model seemed to
fill a niche even if no one could explain exactly what it
was.” (Hawkins 2004, page 65). Even today, most work on
business models is taxonomic and descriptive, classifying
types of business model in lists, heavily derived from
multiple case examples. Typical is Afuah and Tucci’s
eight categories: brokerage, advertising, intermediary,
merchant,
manufacturing,
affiliate,
community,
subscription, and utility (Afuah and Tucci, 2000).
Timmers’ classification is very different: e-shop, e-mail,
information services provider, e-auction, value-chain
services provider, virtual community, third-party
marketplace, value-chain integrator. (Timmer, 1999) There
is no established general classification, which means. that
there is as yet little theoretical base for business model
research and application.
The aim of this paper is to point towards an agenda for
building such a base. Our main conclusions are that the
term business model does indeed add to our descriptive
understanding of the dynamics of organization and our
ability to make sound normative recommendations and is a
necessary intellectual construct. We see an emerging
consensus in the most recent scholarly discussions that
sharpens the concept and that also brings to the forefront
general issues that have largely been peripheral, implicit or
assumed without exploration in the management literature,
particularly the nature of “value” in a customer-driven
world and the implication of the customer-provider-partner
dynamic for evolving the principles for designing
organizations whose core operations rely on interorganizational links and partnerships.
Following an overview of key concepts underlying
business models, this paper highlights the basic principles
upon which business models can be designed and provides
an example of a business model that addresses the design
principles. The implementation of business models and

their design influence the way in which organizations
transform their structures to meet the demands placed
upon them. The contribution of the paper is in the
framework for business model design and in the insight it
provides into the applications of business models and their
effects on organizations. It concludes with practical
recommendations for business model design.

2. Concepts Underlying Business Models

“Logic” and “value” are core words in the literature on
business models. Basically, the emerging consensus is that
a business model is a hypothesis (i.e., a model) of how to
generate value in a customer-driven marketplace. It is a
highly focused “public” declaration intended to help
identify and build relationships that are core to turning the
model into reality. Magretta highlights the “narrative”
element of business models: “The business model tells a
logical story explaining who your customers are, what
they value, and how you’ll make money providing them
that value.” It is in this sense that we view a business
model as a hypothesis to be tested in the marketplace and
often subject to public scrutiny particularly by investors.
Hawkins (2004) makes the interesting point that a business
model may become a product in and of itself. Certainly, in
the dot com era the business model was the selling point
for most startups and it is very much the “brand” for such
successful e-commerce firms as Amazon, eBay and
Priceline.
The most parsimonious definition of business model is
by Rappa (2002): it “spells out how the company makes
money.” Betz (2002) similarly states that it is “an
abstraction of a business identifying how [it] profitably
makes money.” “A business model is a blend of three
streams that are critical to the business. These include the
value stream for the business partners and the buyers, the
revenue stream, and the logistical stream.” (Mahadevan,
(2000). Linder and Cantrell, (2001) extend their own
definition of a business model as “the organization’s core
logic for creating value” to its including within it: “the set
of value propositions an organization offers to its
stakeholders, along with the operating processes to deliver
on these, arranged as a coherent system, that both relies on
and builds assets, capabilities and relationships to build
value.”
There are several common themes running through
these conceptions. The most distinctive is the focus on
“value.” The second is that they all stress that a business
model is a statement of the basic “logic” of the business; it
is an abstraction of propositions, articulated as claims and
intentions. In some regards, this intellectual base for
business models contrasts usefully with the less rigorous
conception of business vision that preceded it; both of
these are intended to set the framework for strategies for
market innovation and/or organizational transformation.
This relates to the third common theme: the separation of

business model from business strategy and also from
organizational structure. The business model establishes
the principles and axioms on which strategy is built.
Strategy follows on from the business model and is
targeted to achieve competitive differentiation. To some
degree, the business model is the “what” of business
innovation and strategy the “how.” As a number of
commentators observe, the two terms business model and
strategy are often used interchangeably. This both weakens
the value of the sharp logic of an effective business model
and makes it a redundant concept if it is just a variant on
strategy.
The separation of business model from strategy has
far-reaching impacts. The most consequential is that the
logic of value-generation is the core of a business model;
the details of how to realize that value are in the domain of
strategy. Many of the dot com models were hypotheses of
value-generation that may have looked accurate in the
laboratory stage of the startup but were not supported in
the large-scale application of the model in the marketplace.
These are often referred to as “broken” models. Others
were perhaps valid hypotheses but were undermined by
inattention to execution. Many commentators argue that
too many companies and their investors saw their business
model almost as self-implementing. Strategy and
execution were ignored.
An in-depth series of research studies of e-commerce
retailing innovations in eight countries ranging from
Australia to Hong Kong to Greece to Denmark to the
United States, concludes that a clearly stated and
understood business model is a prerequisite for success,
but ultimate success or failure rests on the capability of the
firm to customize both model and follow-on strategy to the
dynamics of the market (Elliot, 2002). The case studies
show very clearly that while the specifics of the business
models, markets, consumer factors, and regulatory and
business environments differ widely across the world, the
management issues are very similar. This suggests that
there is a sharp distinction between model and strategy
that may be characterized as innovation plus discipline. It
is a truism that many of the dot coms focused on
innovation at the expense of discipline – business model at
the cost of strategy.
Magretta provides one example of the distinction and
its implications. After discussing Dell’s business model
that transformed the basics of an entire industry and – a
measure of an effective model – has turned out to be
difficult to replicate, she adds that “What often gets lost in
the Dell story is the role that pure strategy has played in
the company’s superior performance. While Dell’s direct
business model laid out which value activities it would do
(and which it wouldn’t do), the company still had crucial
strategic choices to make about which customers to serve
and what kinds of products and services to offer.”
(Magretta, 2002, page 8.) Several competitors, such as HP,

attempted to duplicate Dell’s direct sales model and failed
(just as Dell failed when it moved its strategy in the
opposite direction from its business model to add in-store
sales). Companies and commentators often speak of
“adopting” a particular business model. The term is
revealing in that it implies that adoption equates to
execution.
Many commentators, particularly in the business press,
blur the distinction between business model and strategy.
That leads to such 2005 headlines as “Wayport Unveils Its
McDonald’s Hotspot Business Model.” Translated, this
means that Wayport, a wi-fi service provider, has entered
into a joint agreement for Waypoint and its many other wifi partners to offer services in McDonald’s restaurants for
a fixed monthly fee. This is strategy, not model. “Winter
Schedule Moves TWA Into American’s Business Model”
similarly means that TWA has been integrated into
American Airlines operations, with some changes to
TWA’s flight frequencies and aircraft types. Both airlines
operate under basically the same business practices.
Business model has little to do with the integration. An
announcement by AutoByTel states that it will conduct a
90-day test of a new GM online locate-to-order business
model. This more deserves the term “business process than
business model. “IBM Unveils Its China Business Model”
equally could be restated as IBM China’s organizational
plan, since the main thrust is to open new offices that
operate as China IBM rather than as an international
division of corporate IBM.

3. Business Model Design Principles
There are very few guidelines in the research literature
on business models as to the principles for designing a
business model. This is not surprising if the main criteria
are those of the U.S. Patent Office: usefulness, novelty and
non-obviousness. Amit and Zott identify theoretical work
on value creation that provide some inputs to business
model thinking (Amit and Zott, 2001, page 511). These are
value chain analysis, Schumpeterian innovation, Resourcebased theory, Strategic network theory, and Transaction
cost economics.
They map these against four design schemes, as shown
below (our table is adapted from the original) that the
researchers identify from their empirical surveys:
efficiency, innovation, complementarities (the firm’s
bundling of capabilities and resources and its bundling of
products and services) and customer lock-in. The table
entries describe the degree to which the different
theoretical frameworks view each of the design schemes as
important for value creation. Schumpeter’s “creative
destruction”, for instance, views innovation as a high value
generator. Transaction cost economics, which has been the
underlying intellectual underpinning of many brokerage,
value-adding intermediary and business-to-business
initiatives, regards innovation as of low importance.

Table 1: Principles of Business Model Design

Schumpeter
ian analysis
Value chain
Analysis
Strategic
network
theory
Resourcebased
theory
Transaction
cost
economics

Novelty

Efficiency

Lock-in

Low

Complementarities
Low

High
Medium

Medium

Medium

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

Medium

Low

High

Medium

Low

High

Low

Medium

Low

The above analysis points to Efficiency and Innovation as
the two main distinguishing features of successful business
models. This table suggests that designers will not gain
much practical guidance from strategic theory. The focus
on Efficiency leads to transaction cost economics as a rich
source of guidelines, but at the expense of Innovation.
Schumpeterian innovation points to exactly the opposite
path for design. It is a testable proposition that any
business model that can successfully combine the four
design themes will not fit into existing theory. In this
sense, an agenda for study is the role of truly innovative
business models in theory-making.

4. Transforming Organizational Structures: a
missing theme

One topic that seems ignored in research on business
models is the link between model and organizational form.
The main question for research here is does a unique
business model require a unique organizational design?
From the information available on such firms as Amazon,
eBay, Dell, PriceLine, Autobytel and other business
model-driven companies, there is no evidence of any
organizational design that differs from the main trends in
large businesses. Their annual financial reports show
traditional job titles for their senior executives and
traditional organizational functions such as Marketing,
Finance, and Human Resources. A priori, we might expect
that a firm with a business model based on Schumpeterian
innovation would place a high premium on flexibility (See
Fulk and deSanctis (1995) for a comprehensive survey and
synthesis of organizational forms designed to ensure
flexibility and adaptability.) In addition, we might expect a
marked shift towards “customer-centric” designs
(Galbraith, 2002) with an emphasis on account
management and customer relationship managers; that
emphasis reflects the primacy of customer power, a power
that business models aim at co-opting.

Case studies and taxonomies are a form of learning.
Most research to date on business models has focused on
what we can learn from the experiences of both winners
and losers in the e-commerce sphere. Most of the learning
to date has been about the links from model to strategy.
Here, for example, eBay has provided many instructional
lessons. Its CEO has spoken often of how she joined the
company because she was attracted by its distinctive
business model but found a situation where strategy was
badly lacking. That lack was publicly revealed in the
widely-reported crash of its entire Web site for 22 hours.
The CEO has built many new strategic capabilities that
support the business model. Can an eBay provide equal
instruction about organizational form and functioning?
The following sections address this question by providing
an overview of applications of business models to
organizations and the changes to our thinking about
organizations that have ensued as a result of these business
models. Following an overview of contemporary
perspectives on business models, the paper concludes with
implications and research and practice.

5. Applications to Organizations
A business model is not a strategy. The separation of
model from strategy is both the strength and weakness of
the business model concept. Its strength is its focus on
what may be termed the logic of value. This is a useful
addition to management thought and practice, even where
the hypothesis of value-generation failed to be validated in
the marketplace. See Keen (2004) for a discussion of the
early Web-based commerce as an innovation laboratory, to
be looked at in terms of lessons it provides rather than
ratings of successes and failures. We suggest for future
researchers that a fruitful extension of taxonomies of
business models is to map them into taxonomies of valuegeneration. For example, many of the most original
business models fall into a widely used category of “eauctions.” Some of these proposed the application of
reverse auctions (FreeMarket), dutch auctions (an eBay
feature), blind auctions, Japanese auctions, reverse
auctions, Vikrey auctions and many other exotic variants.
These “experiments” (in the sense that many of them
failed) have generated a rich body of empirical studies and
theoretical research. (See for example a detailed study of
blind auctions and transaction cost efficiencies in financial
trading (Kavajecz and Keim, 2003) and the impact of
reverse auctions on U.S. Federal Government agencies’
procurement. (McCaney, 2005) (Reverse auctions are ones
with many sellers and a single buyer, which contrasts with
the more typical situation of many buyers, single seller).
The latter article claims that private-sector reverse auctions
saved FreeMarket’s clients $2.7 billion in 2004, an
average of 15 percent and that the U.S. Navy saved 29
percent for one contract.

Add to these examples Priceline’s unique quasibidding model for travel services, one of the most original
early dot com business models and one that has been a
growing success1 and we have a rich base for assessing the
dynamics of value in the customer-provider-partner
relationship that underlies so many e-commerce and
supply chain management value networks. The most
distinctive feature of the newer business models has been
their assumption that these must be symmetric; all parties
must gain some new value through the relationship. This is
why we described business models in general as
hypothesis of value-generation in a customer-driven
world. (Our emphasis added) Organizational literature is
largely based on a business-driven world: the assumption
has been that companies are defined by their production
function, and must organize to optimize their costs and
operations so that they can gain a differentiation in the
marketplace and attract consumers. The customer is a
recent invention.
It may seem unconventional to speak of the customer
as an invention but in the world of regulation and
oligopolies most industries did not have customers, only
subscribers and consumers. Keen (2004) defines a
customer:
1. Customers have choices
2. They have the information to evaluate options and
locate deals
3. They have the confidence to make those choices
4. No one can block them from exercising their rights to
make their choice
5. No one can prevent new entrants offering new
choices.
When all of these factors apply, as they do in ecommerce and such sectors as mobile phones, travel
bookings and financial services, companies must think
carefully how to balance value to the customer with value
to themselves. Business models are a vehicle for
addressing this balance. Up through the 1980s and in many
instances through to the new century, industry boundaries
were tightly defined, either through regulation (banking,
telecommunications), industry structure, advantages of
scale, and barriers to new entrants (automotive,
pharmaceuticals), so that “consumers” largely had
constrained choices, and the main challenges to the
organization were its own internal structures, processes
and administrative coordination. The structure of an
industry often meant that information was available to
intermediaries, such as car dealers and travel agents, but
not to customers. In the early days of such deregulation as
long distance phone service, customers had choices but
lacked the confidence to make them and thus stayed for a
time with the previous monopoly provider.
1

Priceline reported $50 million in profits for fiscal 2004, a
57 percent increase over 2003.

“Value” in this business- rather than customer-driven
context means value to the company as the goal, with that
value depending on consumer satisfaction. Cost, market
share and price were the main variables of value
management. Relationships with suppliers were very much
based on bargaining and contracts, with power customers
playing off suppliers and vice versa. (See Dyer (1996) for
a discussion of this power game in action in the
automotive industry and the start of a move in Chrysler to
move to a win-win rather than win-lose relationship.)
The primacy of this perspective in which the customer
plays a relatively passive role as a buyer and suppliers are
just suppliers is apparent in Michael Porter’s influential
value chain framework. (See Porter (1994) for his own
synthesis of the evolution of his thinking on competitive
strategy, which aimed at fusing what he describes as the
two main and contrasting views of strategy, one that
emphasizes organizational differentiation via what is now
termed core competencies and one where “competitive
advantage was defined by a single variable: cost.”)
Porter’s own conclusion is that strategy “must begin by
declaring a clear goal for the enterprise: in my view, this
should be superior, long-term return on investment.”
(Porter, 2004, page 251). Out of this perception came his
five forces of industry model, followed by the value chain.
One of Porter’s most central tenets hints at one reason for
the emergence of business model conceptualization: “the
fundamental unit of analysis for developing strategy is the
industry.” (Porter (1994, page 290).
Put together the industry and the goal of ROI and there
is no analytic or normative need for the business model
view. The industry as given is in effect the business model.
Moreover, there is a relatively fixed amount of value to be
shared out among competitors. For example, the number
of cars to be purchased in a country establishes the value
boundaries for auto makers, dealers and parts suppliers.
Each of them will use strategy to optimize their operations
and create some differentiation that increases their share of
the value pool.
The need for an additive, complementary and even
conflicting view of value generation emerges if the
industry is not taken as a given. In the case of ecommerce, many of the most successful innovations do
not fit into traditional industry categories. eBay and
Google are examples. In addition, much of the reason for
many companies to explicitly define a business model is to
create an innovation that either disrupts an existing
industry (Priceline is an obvious example) or creates a new
niche that does not directly fit into the existing industry
structure. AutoByTel is a typical example here; it is both a
car dealer, wholesaler, broker and information service. Its
business model is to create new (1) customer value by
providing information and also accessing the best deals for
them, (2) partner value through bringing opportunities to
dealers, lenders and other service providers, and (3)

company value by building transaction fees. The logic of
the AutoByTel business model is to create a new value
pool, exploiting the automakers’ and dealers’ strategies:
new models, pricing, advertising and distribution.
Netflix is a company that, like eBay, opened up a new
value space and created a niche through its simple but
ingenious business model of subscribers renting videos via
the Net in a way that reversed the store front strategy of
such companies as Blockbuster; the company comes to the
customer instead of the customer having to pick up and
return items to the store. Netflix now faces competition
from Amazon, for whom Netflix’s strategy for delivery,
pricing and operations can be quickly incorporated into its
own online customer interface and processing platform,
and until recently from Wal-Mart, which implemented a
low price service that it abandoned because it was unable
to build the scale it needed; it handed over its subscriber
list to Netflix, presumably to ward off Amazon. Given
Wal-Mart’s immense capability base and track record,
Netflix’s success reflects a business model rather than
business strategy edge.
What is the industry that combines Blockbuster,
NetFlix, Wal-Mart and Amazon? It does not seem useful
to use the term “industry” here. Kim and Mauborgne
(1999) point out that a business model can create an
entirely new market space through mobilizing customers
for a new type of product or service. “Mobilizing” means
attracting and keeping customers and partners, which
depends on the value the business model offers to
customers compared with alternate choices.
The experiences of e-commerce seem to point to a
conclusion: A company within an industry needs a
strategy; a company aiming at becoming a new entrant,
bridge industries, or create a new market space needs a
business model first. A company within an industry that
sees a major need or opportunity to transform itself will
need to articulate those changes through a business model.
That model in all these instances must provide a
convincing logic of value-creation.

6. The Role of a Business Model

Business models are generally a feature of startups, for
the simple reason that they need a convincing logic and
narrative. There is no real evidence of established
companies announcing a new business model. They
publish instead announcements of strategic shifts. Some
writers on the topic do look retroactively at such
companies as Wal-Mart, Microsoft and Southwest and
review their business models. But this does not seem a
useful or instructive exercise, since as Porter so strongly
argues, it is strategy that drives these firms. Only if their
leaders were to decide to radically change the direction of
the company would they need a new business model. Only
then would outsiders be interested in hearing about it. For
instance, reviewing Wal-Mart’s business model in use

today does not throw much light on either Wal-Mart or
what a new company might do. Perhaps a way of bridging
the gap between business model and strategy is to
recognize that an effective business model must first be
supported by effective strategy and over time become
embedded in the strategy. McDonald’s, Wal-Mart, FedEx,
Cisco and Dell were built on their founder’s insights that
were crystallized in what was clearly a business model
(Michael Dell appears to be one of the earliest chief
executives to use the term). Now the model is still the
reference point for strategic planning but just that: a
reminder of the founding principles – and the logic of
value-generation.
This suggests that, as Magretta states, there is a public
narrative element to business models and that they serve a
different purpose than a comparable statement of strategy
(Magretta, 2002). The audience for these narratives is
often the investment community, who tear apart the logic
of the model and the detailed economic justification of its
value-generation. In other instances, it is the base for
building a culture and for getting everyone on the same
page. This suggests that there may be a fruitful link in
assessing the role of business models in terms of stories
being the “lifeblood” of an organization. (Mitroff and
Kilmann, 1975). Boje (1991) states that organizations are
essentially story-telling systems. Siehl and Martin (1982)
argue that stories are key indicators of underlying cultures
and that socialized members of an organization are
knowledgeable about its main stories. Stories are scripts in
organizational settings (Martin, 1982). Quinn and
McGrath view stories as part of the transformation of
organizational cultures (Quinn and McGrath, 1985).
Most of the literature on story-telling discusses stories
that emerge within the organization. A business model
may be thought of as a story that helps build and motivate
an organization. In this context, it is noteworthy that many
of the radical innovations in business are associated with
well-known stories. Examples are Taiichi Ohno visiting
U.S. supermarkets and realizing that here was a key to
transforming car manufacturing through just-in-time
inventory, Michael Dell working out of his University of
Texas dormitory room and realizing that the world of
personal computers must inevitably move from high-tech
premium product to commodity, and Pierre Omidyar, the
founder of eBay, talking with his fiancée about her
collection of Pez dispensers and wondering if the Web
might open up new opportunities for collectors to find
items.

7. Business Model Uniqueness

One of the more interesting aspects of business models
in that they can be patented in the United States. Many
observers regard this as either a loophole in the patent
system or a dangerous misuse of it, or both of these.
Others argue that it is a necessary protection of intellectual

property that encourages innovators and entrepreneurs. To
obtain a patent, applicants must demonstrate that their
invention is useful, novel and non-obvious over “the prior
art.” It must also fall into one of four categories of subject
matter: machines, articles of manufacture, compositions of
matter, and business methods. Business models fall into
the fourth category.
Business method patents are relatively recent. They
were first recognized by the U.S. federal courts in 1998.
Since most business methods have been in use for twenty
years or more, there are few “novel” inventions to make a
claim for, except for Internet-based business methods.
There has been a flood of these. Priceline patented buyerdrive online reverse auctions, Amazon its one-click
method, and Sightsound patented its “method for
transmitting a desire video or audio digital signal stored on
a first memory of a first party to a second memory of a
second party.” It then sued music retailers who sell
downloads and demanded royalties from mp3 music
providers. Google, which was one of the pioneers of
online search engines, was sued by a small company that
had patented a “system and method for influencing a
position on a search result list generated by a computer
network search engine.”
Much of this appears bizarre but the patents get
awarded and there are as many defenders as opponents of
the patent criteria. The more general issue it highlights is
that business models may be a form of intellectual
property and have an economic value if they pass the test
of useful, novel and non-obvious. In 2003, Netflix was
awarded a patent for its online DVD subscription service.
The patent covers the firm’s value-generating processes. It
provides a significant challenge to other companies
already in or known at the time to be planning to enter the
online market, including Wal-Mart, Blockbuster and
Amazon. Many commentators expect that Netflix will be
acquired, with its patent its major asset.
Usefulness, novelty and non-obvious would seem to be
an appropriate test of the value of a business model,
regardless of the patent issue. Zott and Amit conclude
from their survey of that the more efficient the design of a
business model (appropriation of value to the company
through four design “themes”) and the more its novelty,
the greater the value appropriated to the “focal” firm. (Zott
and Amit, 2002).

8. A Framework for Design

One question that to date has had not been widely
explored in the literature on business models is when does
an established company need to define a new model rather
than a refinement in or redirection of strategy? This is a
consequential executive choice. Our line of reasoning
throughout this paper has been that a business model
establishes first order principles and that strategy is the
second order derivative of imperatives for action. To

redefine an existing business model therefore is likely to
be more disruptive and challenging than changing strategy.
It is accordingly rare to find an explicit statement by a
CEO of plans to change the business model of the firm,
even when it is facing major competitive problems. One
example of a leader who did indeed announce a change to
the business model is Lou Gerstner’s repositioning of IBM
at a time when it was failing badly and was seen as a
disaster in the making. IBM’s value-generation had for
almost a century rested on its proprietary systems and tight
relationships with corporate customers. Gerstner
announced that the firm would in future move to open
systems and wider collaborative relationships, including
with competitors, and become as much a services provider
as a hardware/software builder. Asked what his “vision”
for IBM was, he stated that he did not have one. (Gerstner,
2002) A vision is not a business model.
The business model shift that he announced certainly
moved IBM in an entirely different direction from its
historical strategy and has provided the first order
principles on which he and his successor have evolved
new strategy, including buying a large consulting firm,
adopting the Linux open source operating system, and
licensing its previously closely protected patents. By
contrast, analyses of two other failing businesses that like
IBM had dominated their ecosystems for decades, were
household names and had been models of performance do
not address their business model but focus on strategic
missteps. The two are Sony and General Motors, whose
efforts between 1995 and 2005 to stem loss of market,
profit crunches and anemic or even negative sales growth
had all failed. No commentator challenged their business
models. Sony’s rests on continued product innovation and
wide variety of products; its strategic missteps were
summarized bluntly by the newly-appointed CEO as “the
silos were not the slightest bit interested in coordinating
and there was no one there to coordinate.” (Schlender,
2005) GM’s business model is to build production volume
to spread its fixed costs, leverage its scale and dealer
network, and attract customers through a wide range of car
and truck models.
Here then is the fundamental issue for large
organizations committed to transformation: Should the
business model or the business strategy be the focus of
initiative? We present below a framework that may help
companies in answering it. It is a conceptual model of
global sourcing of talent and capabilities, developed from
a wide range of studies of e-commerce and international
business. (Keen 2004, 2004a, Williams and Keen, 2005).
We use it here to help sharpen the distinction between
three levels of perspective on the vexed topic of
outsourcing: operational tactics, business strategy and
business model positioning.
Operational tactics handle outsourcing as a make-buy,
largely cost-based option. Commentators here draw

heavily on transaction cost economics. The choice of inhouse operations versus outsourcing fits well in that
theory, trading off purchase costs and coordination costs.
The business strategy level of analysis is more radical and
often involves contracting for a services provider to take
over a whole function, such as back office administration
and data centers. The strategic emphasis here is often on
core versus non-core activities.
The Global Capabilities Sourcing (GCS) framework
reframes “outsourcing” as a more general business model
issue. (The logic behind the model is presented in (Keen
2004a). This logic suggests that coordination technology
built around Web services is opening up new opportunities
for organizations to access services across the globe via
standardized product and process interfaces. (Williams and
Keen, 2005)
It also creates the opportunity for companies, cities and
regions that are physically small to become “e-Big.” It is
now routine for teams of computer programmers from
Eastern Europe and the old USSR to make their living
working remotely for foreign companies. Research teams
similarly link to customers anywhere. Intellectual talent is
now relatively location-independent.
The pressures of deregulation and trade liberalization
plus overcapacity are increasing commoditization and
eroding operating margins in more and more industries.
The demographics of developed nations are increasingly
unfavorable for business growth: an aging population with
high labor cost burdens. The burden is not just the direct
cost of wages and salaries but the additional employer
payments for payroll taxes, retirement, welfare and
healthcare. GM, for example, pays manufacturing workers
around $20-30 an hour but the total burden is over $60 an
hour. Germany similarly carries heavy social payments
added to direct wages.
The education systems of the rest of the world have
caught up with Europe and North America. India (the
fourth largest country in pharmaceutical research) and
China are graduating 2-20 times the number of students in
technical fields as the U.S., where half of all advanced
technical degrees are earned by foreign students who are
increasingly either staying in their home countries or are
discouraged or blocked from applying to U.S. universities
because of visa delays and restrictions imposed post 9/11.
“The China Price” has made many industries’ costs
untenable. The China Price is a cliché coined in the mid2000s that equates to “whatever your own price is, less 30
percent.” They have little choice but to find new sources
of lower cost, high quality capability in order to remain
competitive.
Combine all these factors – the problem of costs and
the China Price plus the opportunity opened up by
coordination technology to move the work to where the
people are instead of the other way round, the eBig supply
of skills, a plus large global pool of well-educated labor,

and the result is a new segmentation of global business, as
shown in the figure below.
Figure 1: Global Capability Sourcing
Labor Cost Burden
Skills
Premium
Commodity

Low
1.
Specialist Services

High
4.
Creative Economy

2.
Assembly Economy

3.
Outsourcing Crisis
Generator

1. Specialist services offer premium skills at (for now
at least) a low cost burden. Engineering, research,
architectural design, electronic records management,
computer systems development and operations, drug
testing, telemarketing….. The list grows. Cost is obviously
a key factor here but it is the quality at low cost that is the
main attraction. Many specialist services firms combine
low labor costs with low overhead because of their
specialization. Flextronics, for instance, is the contract
manufacturer whose production is larger than the sales for
most of the consumer electronics and computer hardware
brands for whom it is the manufacturer, assembler and in
many instances design partner. Its overhead is in the 2-3
percent range versus the more typical 15-20 percent for its
customers. Such firms take on much of the business risk of
their clients, converting the fixed costs of their in-house
manufacturing to a variable cost pay-as-you-go. One
example here is Magna Steyr, the Austrian-Canadian firm
to whom BMW contracted the total manufacturing of its
X3 sports SUV, saving $1 billion in capital investment and
five years of lead time. This is less the area of outsourcing,
which tends to mean “out of sight, out of mind and off my
budget” than co-sourcing: collaborative agreements to
share tasks and responsibilities, with the company
concentrating on its own priority tasks and using its
premium skills. In doing so, it is in many ways insourcing
rather than outsourcing capabilities. BMW insources
Magna Steyr’s industry leading production engineering
and quality control so that it can focus its own resources
on design engineering.
2. The assembly economy is the sad area of many
lesser developed countries. Here, low cost workers handle
commodity tasks. Many of the widely-reported abuses of
workers in the textile and apparel industry reflect the fact
that this segment is price-based with no premium offer to
add. Every month, there is a buyer looking to cut prices
and a factory having to do so to stay in business. It is
interesting to note how China, which has been the main
beneficiary of the World Trade Organization’s removal of
all tariffs on apparel goods for its members, has responded

to the threat of new restrictions being imposed on it after
its exports to the U.S. increased by as much as 1,000
percent in some categories in the first three months of the
new regime. It is moving out of the bottom end of the
market – the $3 t-shirt and bundle of six pairs of socks for
$2. It will leave that to the low cost assembly economy of
such countries as Bangladesh and El Salvador. China’s
edge is quality and education, not just cost.
3. The outsourcing crisis creator is the sad area of
many developed countries: high labor cost burdens for
commodity skills applied to commodity tasks. A
commodity task may be defined as one that can be learnt
in weeks and that is a strong candidate for automation:
back office administration is the obvious example, along
with routine telemarketing, machine-tending and customer
phone service. These are jobs that are increasingly also
candidates for contract- and price-based outsourcing to
specialist services, wherever those may be located. It is
distressing to many IT professionals to hear much of their
own work described as “commodity” in nature but many
activities are just that. They can be well-handled by
educated foreigners who often earn one tenth the amount
they do. Where the labor burden is high, these jobs will be
moved and new ones not created to replace them.
Germany, for instance, has not generated a net increase in
manufacturing workers in over a decade.
4. The fourth quadrant is the Creative Economy, our
term that parallels the concept of the Creative Class
(Florida, 2002). Florida claims that in cities and regions of
the U.S. that are dominated by design companies,
researchers, the arts, higher education, media firms and
other creative communities, earnings are around 35
percent higher than the average. The corollary of this is
that the only way a company can escape the commodity
trap of eroding margins, the China Price and the
outsourcing crisis creator is to be part of the Creative
Economy: design, invention, innovation and skilled
customer relationships and experience-building. That is
how high labor cost burden areas can maintain their
standard of pay and living. The alternative is to narrow
down the business model and focus on creating roles as
specialized services as part of a value complex. Maga
Steyr is part of BMW’s value complex or value web, for
instance. (We prefer the term complex because such
supply chains as, say, that of Dell involve multiple
procurement, production, distribution and service webs.)
The Creative Economy is closely tied to the other cells,
especially specialized services. Apple, for example, is a
design company not a consumer electronics manufacturer
that co-sources and outsources many functions. HP takes
this to an extreme with its printers, by far the most
profitable of all its products. HP neither makes nor repairs

its printers. Contract manufacturers make them and UPS
picks them up and services them in UPS warehouses.
The GCS framework is evocative in its implications for
business model versus strategy. If our analysis is correct,
many firms will soon find that their existing model is not
sustainable in the longer-term. Many are stuck in Cell 3 –
the outsourcing crisis creator – and, as suppliers,
vulnerable to the specialist services innovators. They are
vulnerable as producers to commoditization. They are in a
value-eroding not value-generating position. The question
that the framework raises is what role does a particular
company most effectively play in the global sourcing
economy? Many of the most effective business models of
the past two decades have been ones where a company
builds
a
distinctive
role
in
an
expanding
company/customer/business partner complex, often by
surrounding a commodity transaction with value-adding
services. UPS is one example of surrounding the basic
package delivery with third party logistical services that
include repairs, financing, international customs and
payments, and many others. Consumer electronic and cell
phone manufacturers are extending their value web roles
by allowing 60% of their products to be made by third
parties.
Regardless of the specific applicability of the GCS
framework, it highlights the major difference between
viewing sourcing as a tactical matter, a strategic option or
the basis for a new business model. The choice of
perspective is a choice of transformation target and
opportunity: tactically transform selected operations costs,
strategically improve overall company efficiency, or
redefine identity, roles and value complex/web.
This choice of transformation response has profound
implications for the structure of organizations. Modern
businesses are increasingly sourcing processes to and from
other organizations, often located in different parts of the
world. The concept of the value web has come to denote a
demand-driven organization that re-configures its business
partner relationships to adapt to changes in customer
demand and/or economic conditions. This nonlinear form
of organization needs to be able to coordinate increasingly
dispersed processes, while continuing to create value.

9. Summary and Conclusions
While it remains very fragmented, the work on
business models provides the basis for practical
recommendations for business model design. We distil the
key insights from the analysis of this paper into the
following recommendations for business model design:
1. An effective business model is rigorous in its value
logic. The role of the many forecasts, figures and
spreadsheets that typically feed into business model
planning is to provide grounding for the hypothesis of
value.

2. Business models are a narrative. They must be
simple in their statement and help to mobilize relevant
stakeholders. These may include investors, customers,
suppliers, and other partners.
3. The Patent Office criteria are relevant to testing the
worth of the business model: usefulness, novelty and nonobviousness. A “model” that fails these tests is part of
business strategy and should be addressed as such.
4. Business models should separate model from
strategy but ensure the links to strategy. If that separation
cannot be made, then again this is the domain of
traditional strategic planning.
5. The most effective business models will be industryindependent, though their initial embodiment in strategy
may be industry-specific. The most powerful business
models will be those that provide an immediate target of
opportunity but that permit the longer-term opening up of
larger and broader market spaces in which to create value
complexes.
This paper has examined the concepts underlying
business models and how they transform organizations. It
has provided guidance as to how to construct viable
business models. It proposes that transformation of
organizational structures are the missing link through
which business models may make a real contribution. By
addressing this missing link, this paper provides an
overview of applications of business models to
organizations. It highlights changes to organizations and
competitive ecologies that have ensued as a result of these
business models.
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